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Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition:
Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference
and FramingTimothy N. CasonPurdue University
Charles R. Plott
California Institute of TechnologyThis study explores the tension between the standard economic the-
ory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are
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© 2014motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment
fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured
preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from
some subjects’ misconception of the game form. We conclude that
choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of
preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error
at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having
been produced by nonstandard preferences.ntroductionThis paper addresses a tension that exists among competing theories re-
garding fundamental properties of preferences. On one hand, the stan-
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dard theory of preference postulates that individuals have preferences
over outcomes and those preferences are independent of the feasible
1236 journal of political economyset of outcomes. On the other hand, nonstandard preference theories,
such as those based on the theory of framing or endowments, hold that
preferences are dependent on and perhaps even constructed from the
context faced by the choosing individual and might have no particular
existence outside that context.1 We suggest that the tension is exacer-
bated by a specific formofmistakemadeby individuals in standard choice
elicitation procedures, especially when combined with the usual con-
vention of equating choice with preference and is further exacerbated by
the absence of an integrated theory of perception.
We perform an experiment similar to testing a scale by measuring a
known weight. This allows a choice based on a preference to be distin-
guished from a choice based on a mistake. The experiment employs the
Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak ð1964Þ method to measure the prefer-
ence for an object for which the subject’s preferences are known—a card
that can be redeemed from the experimenter for 2. All theories agree
that the preference value the subject places on the card is 2. However,
subjects’ choices systematically involve a mistake that we identify as a
failure of game form recognition. As a consequence, instead of revealing
the known 2 preference, the choices masquerade as reflecting prop-
erties often cited as evidence of nonstandard preferences.
From the simple experiment we identify four ingredients that con-
tribute to the tension between standard and nonstandard preference
theory. The first ingredient involves a practice common to both revealed
preference theory and framing theory. Both tend to interpret choice as
revealing, if not defining, a preference. The possibility of systematic mis-
takes implies, however, that researchers in general should not simply
define choice, without qualification, as measuring preference with an
error term added and should be careful in interpreting systematic de-
viations from the standard model as evidence of alternative preferences.
Second, close examination reveals an error in the theory of framing as it
is applied to the structure and measurement of preference theory in
economics. The issue is addressed in Section II. A third ingredient stems
from the fact that the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak ðBDMÞ method of elic-
iting preferences is not reliable. Sections III and IV develop a method
for measuring its inaccuracy. We emphasize that our interest is not in
1 See Lichtenstein and Slovic ð2006Þ. The contrast of ideas is revealed by their summary
of the issue: “If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options,
how can preferences be defined and in what sense do they exist?” ðiÞ. Some may consider
framing as an unstructured catchall for context dependence, but without structure and
supporting theory, it is difficult to envision how it could be rejectable and to take seriously
proposals to modify policy and law to reflect properties of preferences derived from
framing theory. For broad insights into the evolving controversy, see Levine ð2012Þ.
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exploring how more elaborate instructions and training of subjects in
the use of the BDM can “improve” its ability to reveal preferences more
misconceptions and game form recognition 1237accurately. While such a task might be very useful, it is an aside to the is-
sue we pose; in any case, researchers using the BDM in choice experi-
ments employ a wide variety of instructions and examples. The fourth
ingredient is the fact that subject mistakes can be interpreted as evidence
of a particular form of preference. Sections V and VI show that our data
appear to demonstrate a sensitivity to context that is often described as
evidence that preferences are constructed from framing. Our analysis
reveals, however, that this apparent frame-based pattern in the data can
be a consequence of a specific type of mistake by the decision makers.
Many decision makers appear to confuse the second-price auction incen-
tives of the BDM with a first-price auction, which is a failure of game form
recognition. The paper concludes with observations from the literature
and highlights difficulties rejecting preference theories based on framing
and also suggests possible constructive interpretations of nonstandard
preferences that can be useful for policy.
II. Mistakes, Revealed Preference, and FramingWhile many forms of misconceptions are possible, the misconception
studied here is a “failure of game form recognition.” It is a failure of the
decision maker to recognize the proper connections between the acts
available for choice and the consequences of choice, which, by necessity,
are associated with the method of measuring preferences. If the indi-
vidual fails to understand the connection between acts and outcomes,
the choice of acts can be misleading about the preferences over out-
comes. In such cases, choice cannot be equated with preference over
consequences.
The connection between the consequences of acts and the acts them-
selves is sufficiently obvious as part of the theory of choice in economics
that it would seem to require no discussion. Together they form a “fea-
sible set” of consequences from which the choice is selected. Clearly,
choices and decisions do not reveal preference if an individual is mis-
taken about the commodity in the sense that she thinks the purchase
is for an X when she is actually buying a Y. That type of misconception
will be called a failure of game form recognition.2 The mistaken choice
2 The concept of a game form reflects the traditional tools of game theory in which
distinctions are made among game structures that connect acts to outcomes, preferences
over outcomes, and decisions that are the choices from among acts. Much of economic
theory proceeds on the assumption that these elements are known and are treated as
“common knowledge.” When the elements are not known, information and information
sets are key concepts that might be extended to deal with the misunderstanding of the
game form, but this issue is not part of the analysis here.
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should not be interpreted as a preference for Y. There would seem to
be little disagreement that choices based on mistakes do not reflect re-
FIG. 1
1238 journal of political economyvealed preferences over commodities any more than would be the case if
the context included a magician’s “sleight of hand,” fraud, or fine print
too small to read. Mistakes, decision error, and noise can complicate in-
ferences about fundamental economic primitives, and these complica-
tions call for stochastic and heterogeneous models. ðFor an important
application to decision making when agents face risk or uncertainty, see
Wilcox ½2008, 2011.Þ This motivates the empirical approach presented
below in Section VI. As noted by Kőszegi and Rabin ð2008Þ, one must
control for the confounds of mistakes and ðfalseÞ subjective beliefs be-
fore claiming that choices are consistent with nonstandard preferences.
A simple example of an optical illusion illustrates the subtleties. The
example highlights the importance of perception for research on pref-
erence. It also demonstrates the influence on game form recognition
and the difficulty in rejecting any theory when game form recognition is
an issue.3 Consider the task represented in figure 1 in which the subject
is given a monetary incentive to choose a specific oval. The subject is asked
to follow the instructions and choose one of the ovals as directed.
If you are similar to many people, a well-known optical illusion will
prevent you from seeing that your maximum payoff occurs if and only
if you choose the small oval on the left. Because of this misperception,
your choice might be one of the other ovals. ðIn order to see that your
preference is to choose the smallest oval on the left, do not look at the
black puzzle-looking pieces. Instead look at the white areas between the
black parts. Youmight be able to see the word “LEFT.” For those who still
have problems seeing the word, the symbol, bracketed by black lines,
becomes .Þ
The example illustrates how incorrect inferences about preferences
can emerge from the convention of equating preference with choice in
the presence of misconceptions of the game form.4 Naturally the sub-
3 Tversky and Kahneman ð1986Þ use an optical illusion to suggest that, by analogy to
principles governing vision, preferences are subject to context.4 Failures of game form recognition have been documented elsewhere in the literature
and are known to be a source of anomalies in experimental work ðChou et al. 2009; Rydval,
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ject’s preference is to choose the oval that produces the most money, but
the subject may not understand the relationship between the acts ðthe
misconceptions and game form recognition 1239choice of ovalÞ and the consequences of the acts ðthemoney receivedÞ. In
the absence of a precise specification, classical revealed preference the-
ory would just treat the preferences as random. Unconstrained imagi-
nation can produce many plausible theories. What are the possibilities?
Is there a preference across oval size such as a bias against small ovals?
Location presents a possibility that the construction reflects a bias against
extremes such as the far left or right. Other possibilities exist such as a
focus on the most prominent oval followed by adjustment to others. This
cannot be resolved without additional theory or observation.
The theory of framing developed by Kahneman and Tversky is an im-
portant step toward filling the need for a theory of perception and the
process through which the game form becomes understood. They offer
their theory as an alternative to a broad theory of rational choice, but
their approach is indirect. Preferences are equated with choices, as is typ-
ical with revealed preference methodology, but the concept of rational
choice is not explicitly defined. The specific theory they seek to replace
is not stated. Instead of specifying and defining a theory of rational
choice, Kahneman and Tversky assume that rational choice must exhibit
consistency and coherence as defined by a concept of “procedural in-
variance.” They assume that it is a necessary condition. Thus, if proce-
dural invariance is rejected in the data, so is the unstated theory of ra-
tional choice.
The concept of procedural invariance draws heavily on the theory of
revealed preference. In particular, if the decision makers’ understand-
ing and perception of a feasible set of consequences are not changed,
then a choice reflecting preference, the revealed preference, would not
changeðexcept as randomly perturbedÞ. The “feasible setof consequences”
is naturally defined by the game form, the connections between acts, and
the consequences of acts. If the perception of the feasible set is changed
even when the real feasible set has not changed, as could be the case if
the acts and consequences are described differently, then the standard
theory does not predict that the choice should remain the same. Indeed,
revealed preference theory suggests that choices are expected to change
if the perception of the feasible set changes. The role of perception in
making that connection between choice and the feasible set of conse-
quences is a crucial part of the theory. When the perceived feasible set
changes, the concept of procedural invariance does not apply and a sys-
Ortmann, and Ostatnicky 2009; Cox and James 2012Þ. Harrison ð1990Þ introduces the idea
f “games of ðpotentiallyÞ inconsistent information” to describe circumstances in which
e subjects’ beliefs may not correspond to the objective probability distributions assumed
r known in the underlying theoretical model. Game form recognition is nicely illustrated
y the Tower of Hanoi example in Harrison and List ð2004Þ and McDaniel and Rutstro¨m
2001Þ.o
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tematic change in choice cannot be interpreted as a change in prefer-
ences and is not a violation of rationality in the sense of economic theory.
1240 journal of political economyPerception of the feasible set occupies a key role in the theory when
analyzing preferences and the context effects associated with theories of
framing.
Game form misconceptions reveal difficulties with the theory of fram-
ing. Tversky and Kahneman’s concept of a “frame” is firmly tied to the
perception of the game form, the connection between acts and out-
comes. Tversky and Kahneman ð1981Þ make that point clearly: “We use
the term ‘decision frame’ to refer to the decision makers’ conception of
the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associatedwith a particular choice”
ð453Þ. Thus, the Tversky and Kahneman concept of a frame includes the
whole of the game form. Changes in the frame involve changes in the game
formandchanges in theperceptionof thefeasible setasdefinedbythegame
form. The frame thus merges variables that the game form separates. Tra-
ditionally, economics separates the theory of preferences over outcomes
from the feasible set of outcomes as defined by the relationship between
the instruments of choice (the acts) and the consequences of acts—the
outcomes. If the perception of the relationship between acts and conse-
quences changes and the perception of the feasible set has changed, then
choice changes due to perceived changes in the feasible set can be mistak-
enly interpreted as changes in preferences. Different frames in the Kahne-
man and Tversky sense that result in different choices are not violations of
procedural invariance if the subject’s perception of the set of options is
different. If different frames lead to different understandings of the game
form, different choices cannot be interpreted as reflecting different pref-
erences. Thus, choices that change in response to frame changes are not
direct evidence of changing ðor labileÞ preferences. Violations of proce-
dural invariance in the Tversky and Kahneman sense are not necessarily
violations of rational choice in the revealed preference sense. Tests must
include a control and tests for game form misconceptions.
Many experiments show the influence of a frame, which leads Tversky
and Kahneman ð1986Þ to draw the inference that rational choice has no
behavioral foundation and conclude that the standard theory of pref-
erence must be changed. However, as they note, if the frame is trans-
parent, then the choices satisfy key conditions such as dominance and
so invariance tends not to be violated ðS272Þ. They highlight this inter-
pretation in the abstract of this important paper: “Alternative descrip-
tions of a decision problem often give rise to different preferences, con-
trary to the principle of invariance that underlies the rational theory of
choice. . . . Invariance and dominance are obeyed when their application
is transparent and often violated in other situations” ðS251; emphasis
addedÞ. If the pattern of results for nontransparent frames were viewed
as mistakes derived from game form misconceptions, Tversky and Kahne-
man could have concluded that confused subjects make choices that do notThis content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
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seem rational and turned the analysis to the application of standard theory
for nonconfused subjects.5 Of course, a focus on the nature of subject con-
misconceptions and game form recognition 1241fusion and how misperception of the game form can lead to properties of
system and market behavior, some undesirable and some desirable, would
join an analysis with a long history of economics research with that focus.6
Picking up the analysis of preference where Tversky and Kahneman
leave the theory is easier said than done. Testing a theory of preference
based on framing presents a challenge. The preference, which the the-
ory seeks to explain, is determined by the context of the measurement
including the methods used to measure it. According to the theory, all
features of the context are part of the preference-determining frame. It
is a classical observer effect: that what is to be measured is influenced
by the attempt to measure it. This reflects a deep problem of testability,
to which we will return in the final section of the paper in the light of the
experimental results.
III. Untangling the Concepts: Preference Measurement
and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak MethodOur approach to untangling the concepts while respecting the need to
maintain as much observability as possible is to focus on the preference
measurement method. We study commodities, acts, and consequences
that are observable and for which subjects have clearly identifiable pref-
erences.7 The exercise is based on an uncontroversial preference, with no
objective risk or uncertainty to bring expected- or nonexpected-utility
theories into play. We can therefore use that preference to assess the
5 In addition to a theory of preference, Kahneman andTversky introduce a special theory6 A wide range of economic models are based on the failure of game form recognition.
Examples include the competitive model in which individuals make an obvious mistake
when considering prices as constants. The Cournot model of price adjustment has com-
petitors constantly making the mistake that their rivals’ prices will not change. Monopoly
in a general equilibrium model acts with extreme myopia when failing to recognize how its
decisions can ripple back through the economy to influence its decision-making environ-
ment ðsee the discussion in Plott ½1996Þ.
7 We focus on commodities because they are a fundamental building block in economics,
as opposed to the more abstract concept of “prospects.” The “prospects” of prospect theory
are defined in terms of subjectively determined reference points. Thus, prospects differ from
person to person, reflect no common unit of measurement, and need not be observable
The focus on commodity spaces in economics stems from their central role in defining an
observable feasible set and in connecting preferences to scarce resources and the laws o
supply and demand. The common unit of measurement addresses the need for a concept o
“units” that can be summed across agents, captures the concept of market price per unit
and defines the basic concepts of equilibrium and efficient allocations in precise terms.
of subjective probability that is closely related to game form recognition. A “question-
induced beliefs” conjecture has been associated with the BDMprocedure that can influence
choice similar to those predicted by nonstandard preference theories. Similarly, the omis-
sion of the “fact” that Linda is single can reduce challenging paradoxes related to proba-
bility assessments in a classical anomaly ðsee Charness, Karni, and Levin 2008, table 2; 2010Þ.
The issue of subjective probabilities is not addressed in this paper ðsee Plott and Zeiler 2011Þ.
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accuracy produced by the BDM measurement method. An accurate the-
ory and method of measurement should accurately return the measure-
1242 journal of political economyments of things for which measurements are known. The method is like
using a known weight to test the accuracy of a scale. Since the preference
is known, this provides an opportunity to trace any observed departure
from the known preference to the measurement methods and an as-
sessment of what form the unobserved and uncontrolled perception of
the game form takes.
The preference is for dollars and for a card that is directly translated
into 2 with certainty. As emphasized by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Tha-
ler ð1990, 1328Þ, preference inducement of this form implies that the
subjects should value the card at its induced value. Nonstandard theories
of preference do not differ from the standard theory. All theories agree.
The rate of substitution for the card and money is “two” just like the rate
of substitution of 5 bills for 10 bills is “two,” as it is demonstrated in
market transactions every day. Indeed, the experiment itself has an in-
ternal consistency check on the rate of substitution.8 We pose an exper-
iment that is widely used in studies of framing theory, the willingness to
accept as measured by the BDM. We also perform the experiment in
an environment that minimizes the influence of the experimenter and
training, which have both been implicated in affecting measurements in
earlier scientific analysis.
The BDMmechanism has a long history of use as a tool for measuring
preferences. The subject is required to state a dollar value for an object,
such as a mug or a lottery. The stated dollar value is compared to a ran-
domly drawn price. If the measurement is a buying exercise, the subject
buys at the randomly determined price if it is less than the subject’s
stated value. If the measurement is a selling exercise, then the subject
receives the randomly drawn price if it is above the subject’s stated value.
Because the subject does not determine the price paid or received, only
whether it is paid or received, she has a dominant strategy to state her
true value. The subject cannot lose by accurately stating her preferences
for the objects and might gain. The mechanism is popular because non-
incentivized expressions of preferences for objects that are collected by
alternative methods need not be ðtheoreticallyÞ accurately expressed.
The basic theory of the mechanism finds application to wide areas of
economics that focus on policy and institutional design including auc-
8 The card was a thick piece of paper. The subject could keep the card if she wanted.
Unless it was valued as some sort of trophy or work of art, it had no more value other than
a scrap of paper. Its only possible value was from giving it back to the experimenter and
collecting the 2. The subject could keep the card if she placed a value on it that exceeded
the 2 so the choice to exchange it was value revealing. Of the 264 cases in which subjects
faced the decision to keep the card or to turn it in for the 2, in all 264 cases they took the
2, including 217 cases in which subjects stated a BDM willingness-to-accept value greater
than 2. Logic, theory, and data reveal that the subjective value of the card was the ob-
jectively known and uncontroversial 2.
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tions and public goods. For example, it shares the same ðdominant strat-
egyÞ incentive properties as the second-price Vickrey auction. It is also
misconceptions and game form recognition 1243widely used as a tool for preference measurement in growing and im-
portant new subfields of economics such as behavioral economics and
neuroeconomics.
The reliability of the BDM has been the subject of considerable re-
search, and our experimental design is extremely simple relative to other
applications in the literature.9 In part, the simplicity of our design is dic-
tated by a need to strip the experiment from other potential explanatory
variables that can be found in the more complex applications. Our ap-
proach is a bit “upside down” from the usual applications of the BDM in
which the preference for the object is not known and is sought through
the application of the BDMmechanism. By contrast, we use an object for
which the preference is known and clearly defined: money. The objective
of our experiment is to determine if the application of the BDM to mea-
sure the preference, as if we did not know what the preference is, returns
an accurate measure of the preference that we know exists. It is a test of
measurement accuracy and reliability since people prefer more money
to less. In essence, our experiment amounts to giving subjects an oppor-
tunity to express a preference for money stated in the context of a BDM
method of preference measurement.
The opportunity given the subjects is shown in figure 2. Subjects are
handed the card exactly as displayed, with the left half of the figure on
the front side of the card and the right half on the back. The first sen-
tence explains that the card is worth 2. Subjects are instructed to state
an offer price that amounts to a minimal selling price for the card. A
posted price is randomly drawn from the interval ½0, p, where the lower
and upper limits are clearly printed on the card and the upper limit dif-
fers randomly across subjects. If the posted price is above the subject’s
offer price, the subject is paid the posted price; if not, the subject is paid
9 See, e.g., Kagel and Levin ð1993; indirectly through the study of second-price auc-
tionsÞ, Bohm, Linde´n, and Sonnega˚rd ð1997Þ, Irwin et al. ð1998Þ, Grether et al. ð2007Þ
James ð2007Þ, and Urbancic ð2011Þ. While the results have been mixed, it survives as a use
ful tool, and researchers have employed it in various ways. Its performance appears better
when buying or selling prices are chosen from a price list ðVossler and McKee 2006
Murphy, Stevens, and Yadav 2010Þ, although the use of a coarse grid of possible valuation
does not provide narrowly defined valuation estimates and thus is a relatively weak test
Harstad ð2000Þ compares ascending-bid English auctions and second-price auctions and
identifies the key role of feedback for promoting learning. Rutstro¨m ð1998Þ documents
less overbidding in the BDM compared to second-price auctions. Some studies have “trained”
subjects on its revelation incentives using objects of known, objective value before using it to
value things of interest ðe.g., lotteries, productsÞ, e.g., Noussair, Robin, andRuffieux ð2004a
2004bÞ. Others have trained subjects using different lotteries before eliciting values o
objects ðPlott and Zeiler 2005Þ. Later comments by Isoni, Loomes, and Sugden ð2011Þ pu
these training procedures at the center of the discussion. Researchers have also used
examples and explained the strategy of the process and why it is theoretically incentive
compatible.
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the 2 for the card. After the subject states an offer price, the opaque tag
on the back can be removed, revealing the predrawn random posted
FIG. 2.—Decision form used in both rounds
1244 journal of political economyprice. Notice that the procedure removes the possibility that the posted
price might depend on the subject’s offer price. It also largely removes
the experimenter from personal contact with the subject. Thus, concerns
based on how the behavior of the experimenter might influence the sub-
jects do not apply. After she reveals the posted price, the subject com-
putes the amount received for the card as determined by her offer price
and the randomly determined posted price.
In this choice situation, a subject who prefers more money to less has
a dominant strategy of stating 2 as an offer price. Failure to state 2
reflects a mistake. A subject offering a price higher than 2 will never
receive more and can receive less for the card than a subject offering 2.
If the subject offers 2 for the card, he receives 2 if the random posted
price is less than or equal to 2, but he receives the posted price when-
ever the posted price is above 2. Thus, subjects who offer the card at
values strictly greater than 2 redeem the card at 2 when the posted
price is above 2 but below the subject’s offer price. Regardless of the
probabilities of various draws, a failure to offer 2 means that the subject
simply failed to take the opportunity to receive extra money when avail-
able, and we know that is something that the subjects do not want to do.
The decision must rest on a misconception, mistake, or confusion.This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
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To verify that the failure to take money when available was a mistake,
the experiment included a repeat decision in which subjects are given
misconceptions and game form recognition 1245the opportunity to correct the mistake when faced with a nearly identical
choice. After the subject completes the question on the back of the card,
which reinforces attention to the rules and the possible outcomes, the
subject turns the card in. After the first cards are collected, the subjects
are given another card exactly like the first, except that the p on the
second card is usually different from the p on the first card, but because
of the randomness, they are sometimes the same. Again, the correct re-
sponse if the subject understands the options correctly is to offer a price
of 2.
The application of BDM in this environment differs from typical ap-
plications along four dimensions. First, in contrast to the typical appli-
cation of BDM, we know the preference that should be revealed. The
card has a clear cash value stated in the first sentence that is further ex-
plained on the front of the card, and it has no other outside value. It has
no intrinsic value. The subject is acting in isolation, so there is no value
associated with a social context. The card has no enhancement values that
might be created by using words like “gift.” As mentioned in the intro-
duction, the difference between the card and cash is no different from the
difference between two 5 bills and one 10 bill, an indifference that is
expressed daily in transactions. Thus, the analysis proceeds on the propo-
sition that the value of the card to the subject is objectively known to be
2, allowing a test of whether or not the BDM produced an accurate
preference measurement. Second, the choice is repeated with the same
structure of preference, an object valued at 2, only with a randomly
determined different upper limit of the posted price—basically a repeated
measurement of the same preference using the same instructions. Third,
the answers to the questions on the back of the card provide evidence of
how the subject perceived the task.
The fourth dimension is important. The nature of the questions an-
swered at the completion of the first card could expose the subject to
evidence that the subject made a mistake. If the posted price was above
2 and below the subject’s offer price, he can see that by stating a lower
price he would have received more money. Thus the subject is exposed
to evidence of a possible mistake. If the choice was indeed a mistake as
opposed to an accurate statement of preference, and the subject per-
ceives this as a mistake, then the subject would change behavior in the
direction of a stated price of 2. Thus, the experimental design can pro-
duce evidence of failure of game form recognition.With the data in hand,
we then ask if the choices that superficially support a theory of constructed
preference based on a process of framing are explained as mistakes due
to a failure of game form recognition. That examination is contained in
Section VI.This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
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IV. Experimental Procedures
1246 journal of political economyBecause the experiment was so brief, we conducted it during class time
rather than recruiting volunteers to attend a lab session. In particular,
245 subjects participated during the first 10 minutes of seven sections
of Purdue University microeconomics principles classes that were not
taught by the experimenters. One of the experimenters, assisted by two
or three research assistants, simply passed out ðface up, shown on the left
side of the figureÞ the decision cards shown in figure 2. Although all
cards indicated an induced and known “face value” of 2, it was not com-
mon knowledge that all cards had the same face value. The experimenter
orally described this classroom activity as a “simple exercise to understand
how people make decisions.” He asked subjects not to talk and to read the
front of the card themselves and indicate their offer price carefully since
themoney they receive can dependon their answer. They were told to turn
over the card after indicating this price, look under the taped tab, and
write the amount they should be paid. The class sizes were relatively small
ð30–40 studentsÞ in arena-style seating; the experimenter and assistants
observed subjects carefully, and none were seen violating the experiment
rules.
Once all cards were collected, a second card was passed out. This sec-
ond decision round was not announced in advance.10 The card was iden-
tical to the first, except that it was a different color and the maximum
posted price was likely to be different because it varied randomly across
subjects for both cards. Subjects were paid for both card answers, using
sealed envelopes of cash distributed when class was dismissed. Earnings
ranged between 3.05 and 13.66, with an average of 6.11 per subject.
The cards were identical except for the range for the uniformly dis-
tributed random posted price. Theminimum posted price was always 0,
but the maximum posted price was 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8. Each of these
ranges was assigned one-fifth of the cards. While the range does not af-
fect the theoretical incentive compatibility of the BDM mechanism, as
discussed in Section VI, it does influence the expected payoff conse-
quences of suboptimal offer prices.
V. Results: Data PatternsThe prominent patterns of the data are stated here as a series of results
relevant for the implications to be addressed in the subsequent sections.
While the limited reliability of the BDM is of general interest, it has al-
10 The data were collected on three different dates over 15 weeks. None of the main data
patterns, such as the frequency of optimal offer prices in either round or the increase in
optimal offers from round 1 to round 2, are different across dates. This suggests that little
information about the experiment “leaked” out to affect choices made by later subjects,
which is not surprising for this large campus of nearly 40,000 students.
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ready been well documented, including in many of the studies noted
above in footnote 9. The first two results indicate that the proportion of
misconceptions and game form recognition 1247optimal choices ð2Þ is not high but increases substantially on the sec-
ond choice. The third, fourth, and fifth results summarize the relation-
ship between the pattern of “optimal” choices, experience, and subse-
quent choice.
Result 1: With simple instructions and no training or feedback, the
BDM does not provide reliable measures of preferences for the induced-
value object.
Support: Figure 3A displays the distribution of offer prices chosen by
the 245 subjects during the first round, pooling across the maximum
offer price treatments. Only 41 out of the 245 ð16.7 percentÞ subjects
chose offers within 5¢ of the 2 true value. A greater fraction of subjects
chose offers near 3 and near 4 than near the optimal offer. TheseFIG. 3.—Offer price distribution on first choice ðAÞ and second choice ðBÞ
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large deviations from the induced value of 2 are similar to the minimal
information treatment in Irwin et al. ð1998Þ, in which subjects were not
1248 journal of political economygiven information about how the BDM mechanism operates.
Result 2: A second round of decisions ðincluding subjects rereading
the instructions and after receiving feedbackÞ nearly doubles the num-
ber of subjects stating the correct valuation.
Support: Figure 3B shows that the number of subjects indicating an
offer price within 5¢ of the 2 true value increases to 76 out of 244
ð31.1 percentÞ on the second, repeat decision.11 The data strongly reject
the null hypothesis that the rate at which subjects state an offer price
within 5¢ of 2 is equal on the first and second decisions ðFisher’s exact
test p -value < .01Þ.12 Previous experiments using the BDM with induced
values have also documented improved performance following repeti-
tion ðe.g., Noussair et al. 2004aÞ.
Result 3: Subjects that chose the theoretically optimal offer price
ðnear 2Þ on the first card also usually choose the theoretically optimal
offer price on the second card. Subjects who did not choose optimally on
the first card tend to choose a different offer price on the second card.
Support: Of the 244 subjects, 203 did not choose the theoretical op-
timum ðwithin 5¢ of 2Þ on the first card. Of these 203, 159 ð78 percentÞ
chose a different offer price on the second card and 44 ð22 percentÞ
indicated the same offer price. Of the 244 subjects, 41 chose near 2 on
the first card. Of these 41, 35 ð85 percentÞ chose the same offer price
and 6 ð15 percentÞ chose a different offer price on the second card. The
hypothesis that the stability of choice is the same for those who chose
optimally and those who did not choose optimally on the first card is
strongly rejected ðFisher’s exact test p -value < .01Þ.
These results demonstrate that the misconceptions subjects appar-
ently have about the BDM procedure are distinct from potential fram-
ing effects, which we elaborate in the next section. One possible inter-
pretation is that the frame changes when subjects observe different
upper limits of the posted price and the frame is the same if the upper
limit of the posted price remains the same. However, many subjects who
received the exact same upper limit in the two rounds and did not choose
optimally in the first round changed their offer price in the second
round. In particular, 26 of the 46 subjects ð57 percentÞ who observed the
same upper bound ðand thus the exact same frameÞ in rounds 1 and 2
11 The number of observations decreases to 244 on the second decision because one
subject did not write an offer price on his second card.12 This result is robust to using alternative thresholds, such as offer prices exactly equal
to 2, or 10¢ or 25¢ within 2. The number of offers “close” to 2 on the second decision is
76 regardless of whether the threshold to define “close” is 5¢ or 25¢ because the 14 offers
near but not equal to 2 were all within 2¢ of 2 ðothers were at least 50¢ away from 2Þ.
The data suggest no evidence that could be attributed to a “status quo” bias or “endowment
effect” that cannot be explained by the well-known effects of transaction costs.
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but who did not offer within 5¢ of 2 in the first round changed their
offer in the second round. While nonoptimal subjects who received a
misconceptions and game form recognition 1249different upper limit in the two rounds changed their offer price more
frequently ð133 out of 157, 85 percentÞ, framing theory does not explain
the frequent change in behavior even when the frame stayed the same
across rounds. Moreover, those subjects who chose optimally ðpresum-
ably those with no misconceptionsÞ tend to have stable choices, even
when the frame ðinterpreted as the randomprice upper boundÞ changes.
Result 4 illustrates data patterns that could be attributed to a theory of
framing based on this interpretation that the random price upper bound
determines the frame. Result 5 provides more direct evidence that sub-
jects learn across rounds and how the feedback subjects receive at the
end of round 1 affects how they adjust their offer price in round 2. These
two features of the data play an important role in determining the na-
ture of game form misconceptions.
Result 4: For both the first- and second-round choices, the pattern of
nonoptimal price offers is related to the maximum of the posted price
range.
Support: Table 1 summarizes the mean price offers for each of the
five upper bounds in the two rounds for offers not within 5¢ of 2. The
trend is for offers and standard errors to increase as the upper bound
increases, with only a couple of exceptions. Median offers ðnot shownÞ
also generally increase with the upper bound. Table 2 indicates that the
differences in offers for different upper bounds are statistically signifi-
cant in most pairwise tests, similar to findings in Bohm et al. ð1997Þ. The
frequency that subjects offer near 2 is not systematically related to the
upper bound.
TABLE 1
Mean Price Offers for Each Posted Price Range Maximum,
Excluding Offers within 5¢ of 2
Range
½0, 4 ½0, 5 ½0, 6 ½0, 7 ½0, 8
A. Round 1
Mean offer 2.98 3.35 3.50 3.93 3.80
ð.11Þ ð.13Þ ð.18Þ ð.14Þ ð.21Þ
Observations 45 39 39 40 41
Percent offer 2 ± 5¢ 10% 19% 22% 17% 16%
B. Round 2
Mean offer 2.73 3.08 3.37 3.85 4.16
ð.13Þ ð.20Þ ð.25Þ ð.19Þ ð.36Þ
Observations 32 35 28 41 32
Percent offer 2 ± 5¢ 32% 27% 44% 18% 35%
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Result 5: Subjects who were “exposed” to their mistake ðin the sense
that a different offer amount would have increased their payoffÞ were
TABLE 2
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Tests Comparing Offers for Different Posted Price Ranges
Range
Range ½0, 4 ½0, 5 ½0, 6 ½0, 7
A. Round 1
½0, 5 .013**
½0, 6 .001*** .176
½0, 7 .000*** .007*** .135
½0, 8 .000*** .003*** .076* .784
B. Round 2
½0, 5 .007***
½0, 6 .001*** .474
½0, 7 .000*** .005*** .056*
½0, 8 .000*** .007*** .040** .423
Note.—Tests exclude offers within 5¢ of 2. Table entries denote p-values for two-tailed
Wilcoxon tests.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
1250 journal of political economymore likely to choose a correct offer in round 2.
Support: One problem with the BDM is that incorrect offer prices are
financially punished infrequently ðHarrison 1992Þ. In the present con-
text, for example, if a subject states an offer price for the card that is
greater than 2 but the random posted price exceeds this offer price,
then this subject could not have increased her payment by choosing any
other offer. We define a subject as “exposed” to her mistake if an alter-
native offer could have increased her payment. This occurs when the
posted price is greater than 2 but less than the subject’s offer price or
when the posted price is less than 2 but greater than the subject’s offer.
Only 57 of the 204 subjects ð28 percentÞ who incorrectly offered an
amount more than 5¢ away from 2 in round 1 were exposed to their
mistake. Table 3 displays the directional shift in offers from round 1 to
round 2 for those subjects who were exposed to their mistake and those
who were not exposed. Fisher’s exact tests reveal that those who were ex-
posed were significantly more likely to jump to 2 ðp -value 5 .049Þ and
significantly less likely to move even further away from 2 ðp -value5 .024Þ
on round 2.13
13 These statistical tests are based on a transformation of the offers to the ratio
ðoffer2 2Þ=ðp 2 2Þ, where p is the maximum random posted price draw, since subjects
might have faced two different upper bounds and the adjustment relative to the optimum
can be sensitive to this maximum possible price. Results are similar when defining move-
ments using the raw offers, rather than with this normalization, although the p -value for
the difference in propensity to move away from 2 becomes .082.
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Figure 4 illustrates the movements toward and away from the optimal
2 offer using the ratio ðoffer2 2Þ=ðp 2 2Þ, where p is the maximum
TABLE 3
Adjustment of Round 1 to Round 2 Offer Prices for Subjects
Choosing Incorrectly on Round 1
Exposed to
Round 1 Error
Not Exposed to
Round 1 Error
Total subjects 57 ð100%Þ 146 ð100%Þ
Move onto optimum ð2Þ 16 ð28%Þ 24 ð16%Þ
Move toward optimum 24 ð42%Þ 57 ð39%Þ
Choose same offer ratio 9 ð16%Þ 24 ð16%Þ
Move away from optimum 8 ð14%Þ 41 ð28%Þ
Note.—Movements are based on offer ratio ðoffer2 2Þ=ðp 2 2Þ, where p is
the maximum random posted price draw.
misconceptions and game form recognition 1251random posted price draw. By construction of this ratio, 0 is the opti-
mum. No “bubbles” are on the vertical axis because this figure excludes
the 41 subjects who chose the optimal offer in round 1. ðAs already noted,
those subjects nearly always chose optimally in round 2 as well.Þ Bubbles
on the 45-degree line indicate subjects who chose offers to maintain a
consistent ratio in both rounds. ðThe largest bubble representing the
most subjects is at ð0.5, 0.5Þ, and 62 subjects chose offers that led to a
ratio of 0.5 on at least one of the rounds. This is an important ratio dis-
cussed in the next section.Þ Bubbles below the 45-degree line usually in-
dicate movements toward the optimal ratio of 0, and bubbles above the
45-degree line indicate movements away from the optimal offer. Panel A
shows how offers change among subjects who were not exposed to their
error, and they are scattered both above and below the 45-degree line. By
contrast, panel B indicates a more systematic movement among subjects
exposed to their error, below the 45-degree line and toward or onto the
optimal ratio of 0.
VI. Results: ModelsThree classes of general theories can be tested and compared for anal-
ysis of our experimental results: ðAÞ theories based on framing, ðBÞ the-
ories based on task understanding but with noise, and ðCÞ theories based
on specific game form misconceptions. Theories within a class tend to
rest on the same or similar basic principles, but the basic principles dif-
fer across classes. Our data exhibit support for prominent features of
framing theories, which appears to be inconsistent with the claim ðorigi-
nally offered in Kahneman et al. ½1990Þ that the preference for the
induced value card is objective, constant, and known. If the preference
was not known, one could conclude that the preference for the com-
modities resulted from framing. However, a close examination of theThis content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
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FIG. 4.—A, Offer ratios and changes for subjects not exposed to round 1 error. B, Offer
ratios and changes for subjects exposed to round 1 error.
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choices demonstrates that a case for framing is not convincing. The data
are better and more completely explained by a mixture of some subjects
misconceptions and game form recognition 1253who understand the BDM mechanism and submit optimal offers and
others who have a specific type of game form misconception. A discus-
sion of the general theory of framing is reserved for Section VII.
A. Theories of FramingOur data exhibit patterns that could be interpreted as confirming evi-
dence for framing. We are not asserting that the choices exhibited in the
experiment represent preferences constructed through a framing pro-
cess, as we hold no disagreement with the insights from Kahneman et al.
cited above that this should not be the case for induced value items. The
point is that while the data are consistent with choice patterns associated
with theories of framing, a completely different assessment emerges
when comparing these patterns to theories of mistakes stemming from
game form misconceptions. The interpretations of preferences are dif-
ferent when the role of perceptions and mistakes is considered as an al-
ternative theory. Before turning to that assessment, consider first the four
theories suggested by framing listed below. Although they have differing
origins, their empirical implications are similar so they are not distin-
guishable for this simple experiment.
Endowment effect/reference points.—Those names suggest that the data
reflect a special factor such as the “endowment” or a “reference point”
from which utility losses loom greater than gains. This leads to a “kink” in
the utility function at the endowment, the reference point in this frame,
so the asking price for the item ðwillingness to accept ½WTAÞ is greater
than the buying price ðwillingness to pay ½WTPÞ. According to the intu-
ition of framing theory, possession ðownershipÞ of the object creates a
sense of loss should the object be sold or given up in exchange. Since the
object is an induced value card worth 2, some might question whether
the necessary “sense of ownership” will develop, so an “endowment ef-
fect” due to loss aversionmay not be observed.14 However, the data clearly
show BDM measurements of WTA that are substantially more than 2.
These patterns are reported in results 1, 2, and 4. If subjects’ WTP for a
2 card is near this induced value ðas in Irwin et al. ½1998Þ or less than 2
ðas observed for noninduced value objectsÞ, it seems reasonable to con-
jecture that the WTA we have documented is greater than the WTP. In
14 Lange and Ratan ð2010Þ and Banerji and Gupta ð2014Þ formalize the idea that second-
price auctions and the BDM mechanism remain value-revealing institutions for induced
value items even under reference-dependent and loss-averse preferences. We make no claim
that our experiment has other implications based on an unobserved “sense of ownership”
of the card. We refer the reader to discussions of “assignments” in Heffetz and List ð2014Þ
and discussions of “enhancements” in Plott and Zeiler ð2011Þ.
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this case a WTA-WTP gap consistent with an “endowment effect” would
be observed, even though it is not expected for an induced value item.
1254 journal of political economyThus, one might conclude that sellers require compensation for the
consumption value of the ticket plus additional value for the lost “own-
ership” of the ticket, due to loss aversion. Indeed, these data are consis-
tent with what some would describe as a “widely observed” pattern in the
literature.15
Anchor and adjustment.—This theory holds that the frame centers the
subject’s focus on the prominent feature of the good and assesses the
value and then creates a value of the good by adjusting for other features
ðLichtenstein and Slovic 1971; Tversky and Kahneman 1974Þ. A reason-
able assumption is that the prominent feature of the BDM in our ap-
plication is the upper bound of the posted price range. Subjects could
focus attention on the maximum possible value and then construct their
preference through an adjustment downward based on probabilities or
characteristics of the card, but with an incomplete adjustment that
might not consider the strategic issues. The result would tend to be a
value above 2 as is observed, and the positive relationship between the
upper bound and the offers reported in result 4 could be interpreted as
further support.
Attraction to the maximum.—Similar to anchoring, this theory holds that
a psychological “pull” to themaximum payoff ðposted price rangeÞ draws
decisions to it ðUrbancic 2011Þ. Themaximum serves as a reference point
used for the construction of a preference that depends on the distribu-
tion governing the outcomes in the BDM. Presumably this preference
is accurately measured by the BDM mechanism. The preference will be
influenced by the location of the maximum, which is consistent with re-
sult 4.
Expectations of a trade ðKőszegi and Rabin 2006Þ.—Anticipating selling
the item means losing the item for a gain in money. Losses loom greater
than gains, and this motivates a high offer price, especially when the an-
ticipated selling price of the item is high. While the expectations of trad-
ing are not manipulated or directly observed in our experiment, Kőszegi
and Rabin’s model makes predictions that depend on the assumptions
made about expectations for trades. In particular, they note that if the
subject does not expect to trade, then a loss aversion effect will be ob-
served. However, if the subject does expect to trade, then the effect
would depend on the subject’s expectations and how those expectations
may depend on the distribution of the random posted price ðBanerji
15 For example, Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler ð2001, 257Þ state that “the endowment effect
and loss aversion have been among the most robust findings of the psychology of decision
making. People commonly value losses much more than commensurate gains.”
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and Gupta 2014Þ. An initial interpretation of our data is that the sub-
jects expect not to trade and that the predictions of the Kőszegi and
misconceptions and game form recognition 1255Rabin model are supported given the high offer prices stated by sub-
jects.16 Results 1, 2, and 4 contain the appropriate data.
Theories of framing appear to be consistent with parts of the behavior
observed in the experiment. Other results do not support framing the-
ory. Result 3 demonstrates that subjects who choose according to clas-
sical theory tend to repeat this choice. But contrary to framing theory,
that means that they are not influenced by a change in frame ðas the
change in upper limit could be interpretedÞ. More importantly, on the
basis of the convention of defining choices as preferences, the theories
are reporting to have identified and measured a preference contrary to
what was induced. As was established in Section III, we know that the
true preference for the card is 2, but framing theories suggest that the
measured preferences differ from 2. Result 4 demonstrates that sub-
jects who exhibit the features exhibited by theories of framing tend to
be those who change their choice when given the same option again.
Contrary to framing theory, however, part of result 3 indicates that for
many subjects the frame remains the same but the choice changes. Sub-
jects exposed to their possible misconception tend to correct it in the
direction predicted by classical theory ðresult 5Þ onto or toward the op-
timal choice. The patterns of choices across rounds ðresults 3 and 5Þ are
more consistent with learning than with framing.
B. An Optimal Model with NoiseOver two decades ago, Harrison ð1992Þ highlighted the weak incentives
provided by the BDM for truthful revelation of preferences, in the con-
text of his well-known “flat payoff” critique of preference measurement;
see also Irwin et al. ð1998Þ. Some subjects may understand the instruc-
tions and the BDM task, but they could make errors. A key observation is
that errors are very “cheap” in the BDM because they often are not
penalized through financial losses. As already documented, in the pres-
ent data set, only 28 percent of subjects who offer more than 5¢ away
from the correct offer of 2 suffered any monetary cost from their sub-
optimal offer. Moreover, the likelihood of being exposed to a mistake is
16 While the data from the experiment can be interpreted as support for Kőszegi and
Rabin ð2006Þ, our experiment is clearly not the way to test their model. Indeed, like other
framing-based theories, their theory does not predict an endowment effect in our setting
for the reasons given by Kahneman et al. ð1990Þ that endowment effects should not occur
for induced value objects. Nevertheless, the high average WTA observed in our data could
be interpreted as evidence for an endowment effect in the absence of the further analysis
we apply below in Sec. VI.C.
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lower as the upper range of the random price distribution increases, and
the expected cost of an error of any given size is smaller as the range of
1256 journal of political economyrandom price draws increases.
In particular, the expected loss from a suboptimal offer can be cal-
culated as follows: Denote the offer price chosen by the subject as b
and the randomly drawn posted price as p ∼ U ½0; p with maximum
p ∈ f4; 5; 6; 7; 8g. The expected payoff is
E ½p5 2Probðb > pÞ1 Eðpjp > bÞProbðp > bÞ:
For the uniform distribution, this simplifies to17
E ½p5 1
p

2b 1
p2 2 b2
2

: ð1Þ
This can be differenced from the expected payoff earned when choosing
the optimal offer price b* 5 2 to calculate the expected loss for any offer
price other than the optimal offer price of 2, given p.
For example, consider a subject indicating a suboptimal offer price of
3. The likelihood that this subject will see a random draw between 2
and 3 resulting in a loss relative to the correct offer price of 2 is one-
eighth when the range is ½0, 8 but is one-fourth when the range is ½0,
4. The expected loss from this suboptimal offer price is very small for
both ranges, but it is twice as great when the random posted price ranges
between ½0, 4, 12.5¢, rather than ½0, 8, 6.25¢. This suggests that
more errors ðand thus higher average offer pricesÞ will occur for higher
upper bounds for the random price draws, as already documented in
the data ðresult 4Þ. Note that this is simply a model of random mistakes,
which are more likely to occur when they are less costly. This is not a
systematic misconception of the BDM mechanism. In what follows we
will refer to this as the “optimal” or “correct” model with noise.18
17 Note that the brief instructions on the decision card did not state that the randomly
posted price was drawn from the uniform distribution, since the exact distribution is not
relevant for the incentive-compatible properties of the BDM. Calculation of the expected
payoff from each offer does require an assumption for this distribution, and it seems plau-
sible for many subjects to assume the uniform distribution that was actually used, just as
Bayesian analysis often assumes a uniform ðnoninformativeÞ prior based on the principle
of indifference.
18 Given the importance of risk preferences in the “flat payoff ” literature, it seems sen-
sible to generalize the objective function beyond risk neutrality. We considered including
constant relative risk aversion in our model estimates reported below but found that the
best-fitting parameters featured implausible levels of risk aversion for the optimal model
with noise and did not reject risk neutrality for the first-price auctionmisconceptionmodel
described in the next subsection. As an alternative it would be valuable to determine how
risk aversion varies across subjects and is related to observables ðe.g., as in Harrison ½1990
andHarrison andRutstro¨m ½2008Þ, but we have too few choices per subject for such analysis
and did not collect sociodemographic data.
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C. Failure of Game Form Recognition
misconceptions and game form recognition 1257The theory of game form misconception in this context holds that the
patterns of data are not due to a preference that evolved from framing
but are due to mistakes. Moreover, the mistakes are not simply random
departures from a correct understanding of the experimental task, but
rather arise from a misconception of the rules of the BDM. In order to
make a case that the choices reflect a systematic, fundamental mistake,
the mistake itself is described and stated in a form that yields testable pre-
dictions that are comparable to the predictions of other possible models.
Of course, in the absence of specific, testable predictions, the concept of
a mistake can be applied to explain any pattern of choices.
Although the results indicate that some subjects chose price offers of
2 and apparently understood the BDMmechanism, other subjects filled
out their cards incorrectly, and this suggested a specific type ofmisconcep-
tion. Recall that subjects were asked to write on their card the amount they
should be paid after looking under an opaque tab covering their random
offer price. Twenty-nine of the subjects indicated that they should be paid
their offer price even when their offer price was less than the randomly
drawn posted price on their decision card. This does not appear to be a
deliberate “mistake” because they would earnmore by correctly indicating
that they should be paid the drawn random price. ðWe noticed these mis-
takeswhenviewingtheircardstopreparethemoneypaymentenvelopesand
paid subjects the correct, higher amount.ÞThese subjects appear tobelieve
that thepaymentmechanism is similar to a first-priceprocurement auction
in which the lowest offer wins and is paid the offer price. An additional
82 subjects may have had this first-price auction misconception, but our
data do not directly reveal it because on both of their cards their offer was
above the drawn randomprice.19
This type of mistake suggests that some subjects believe that the buyer
accepts the lower price, where the subject’s offer price is in competition
19 These 82 subjects include two who offer the optimal 2, but since their drawn random
offer price was less than 2, we do not know whether they had a misconception. These
offers are possible in the misconception model with noise developed in this section. Ad-
ditional types of possible game form misconceptions are suggested by the data but were so
sparse in the data that we do not pursue them. A few subjects seemed to think that they
would be paid their offer independent of the posted price and thus stated asking prices
equal to the maximum of the range. A few other subjects appeared to think that they re-
ceived a payment only if their asking price was below the posted price and thus stated an
asking price below 2. The prominence of 4 among the price offer distributions, espe-
cially when inexperienced ðfig. 3AÞ, suggests that other misconceptions with an optimal
offer of 4 are possible; the data suggest, however, that misconceptions that imply a posi-
tive relationship between the offer and the maximum of the random price distribution ðta-
ble 2Þ aremore common.One can also imaginemisconceptions emerging from the task itself.
A subject faced with such a simple task as selling 2 for 2 might speculate on what the ex-
perimenters had in mind. We are unable to associate that possibility with any specific form of
behavior that might affect our analysis or conclusions.
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with the random posted price; and if they do not win this competition
ði.e., if they do not have the lower priceÞ, then they are paid the 2 value
1258 journal of political economyon the retained card. In other words, they perceive their expected payoff
to be
~E ½p5 2Probðb > pÞ1 bProbðp > bÞ; ð2Þ
where again the offer price chosen by the subject is b and the randomly
drawn posted price is p ∼ U ½0; p. ðThe mistake here is that b replaces the
correct Eðp|p > bÞ in the second term of the expression.Þ We developed
this alternative misconception model following the data collection when
we observed directly the errors subjects made when filling out their pay-
ment cards. If we had anticipated this first-price auction misconception,
we could have explained to subjects the distribution of the random offer
price since it affects the expected payoffs for different price offers, even
though it does not affect the incentive properties of the BDM.20 For the
uniform distribution, which is a reasonable assumption without addi-
tional prior information, the expected payoff simplifies to
~E ½p5 1
p
½2b 1 bðp 2 bÞ: ð3Þ
If the subject maximizes this incorrect expected payoff expression with
respect to the offer b, then he will set ~b 5 11 0:5p. Importantly, this in-
correct offer depends positively on the maximum price drawn in the
random offer distribution, similarly to the random mistake in the opti-
mal model with noise. Also, note that this offer function results in a
constant ratio for ð~b 2 2Þ=ðp 2 2Þ5 0:5, which appears prominently in
figure 4 among those offers not near 2.
To differentiate empirically between the simple “optimal model with
noise” and the “first-price misconception” explanations in the data, we
turn to a familiar quantal choice framework in which agents seek to maxi-
mize their ðperceivedÞ expected payoff but make ðLuce-McFaddenÞ logit
errors:
Probðoffer5 bjÞ5 e
lE ½pjbj 
onk51e lE ½pjbk 
: ð4Þ
Less costly errors ðin terms of perceived expected payoffsÞ are more likely
thanmore costly errors. The l term indicates how sensitive subjects are to
20 Such an intervention is accompanied by a risk that misconceptions are compounded
through the subjective probabilities. See, e.g., the “question-influenced beliefs” conjecture
of Plott and Zeiler ð2011Þ.
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differences in their expected payoffs. For l5 0, subjects are completely
insensitive and choose all feasible offers with equal probability. As l→ `,
misconceptions and game form recognition 1259the choice model fits perfectly with no error. Of course, we do not claim
that all subjects should be classified as making choices in one way or
another; indeed, the subjects who ðcorrectlyÞ state an offer price of 2
clearly reject this particular model of mistakes. Instead, we use standard
maximum likelihood methods to fit the data pooled across subjects to
the two models and estimate the l that best approximates the aggregate
behavior. Higher levels of l indicate a better fit—requiring less noise to
characterize subject choices according to that particular model. Below
we also estimate a mixture model to determine what fraction of offers is
best approximated by each model.
The log likelihood, conditional on the first-price misconception ðde-
noted with a 1st superscriptÞ, depends on the estimated payoff sensitivity
l1st and the observed choices yi:
lnL1stðl1st ; yiÞ5 o
i
ln l 1sti 5 o
i
lnfyiel1st ~E ½pjbj =o el
1st ~E ½pjbk g; ð5Þ
where yi is an indicator for offer i being in a bin within 5¢ of bj.
21 Similarly,
the conditional log likelihood based on the assumption that the optimal
and correct model is true ðdenoted with an OPT superscriptÞ is
lnLOPTðlOPT; yiÞ5 o
i
ln lOPTi 5 o
i
lnfyielOPTE ½pjbj =o el
OPTE ½pjbk g: ð6Þ
Note that other than the different payoff sensitivity parameters, these
log likelihoods differ only in whether the correct expected payoff ex-
pression E ½p from equation ð1Þ or the misconceived expected payoff
expression ~E ½p from equation ð3Þ is used.
Result 6: Among the subjects who do not choose offers within 5¢ of
the correct offer of 2, the first-price misconception model provides a
better overall fit than the optimal choice model augmented with logit
errors, and a much higher fraction of these offers are more consistent
with the first-price misconception model.
Support: Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the
payoff sensitivity parameters l along with bootstrapped standard errors
and 90 percent confidence intervals. Column 1 is based on all the data
and indicates some small differences in fit between the two models, but
for the round 1 offers, the log likelihood is considerably higher for the
first-price misconception model. The confidence intervals for l overlap
in that column, however, and subjects who offer the correct 2 are un-
likely to have the first-price misconception or make errors. Column 2
21 For tractability in the estimation, we aggregate the offer data into 10¢ bins to reduce
the dimension of the probability vector by one order of magnitude.This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
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therefore excludes subjects who submitted offers within 5¢ of 2, and
here the estimated payoff sensitivity l terms diverge significantly. For
TABLE 4
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Logit Choice Error Parameter l
for Optimal and First-Price Auction Misconception Models
Model
All Data
ð1Þ
Excluding Offers
within 5¢ of 2
ð2Þ
Subjects Revealing
Misconception, or
Possibly Holding It
ð3Þ
A. Round 1
Optimal model lOPT .99 .56 .48
ð.149Þ ð.130Þ ð.141Þ
90% confidence interval ½.81, 1.26 ½.34, .73 ½.25, .74
Observations 245 204 111
Log likelihood 2985.4 2826.8 2449.4
First-price auction misconception
model l1st
1.18
ð.184Þ
1.83
ð.408Þ
3.05
ð.624Þ
90% confidence interval ½.88, 1.49 ½1.30, 2.56 ½2.13, 4.20
Observations 245 204 111
Log likelihood 2954.2 2769.3 2398.2
B. Round 2
Optimal model lOPT 1.12 .30 .01
ð.244Þ ð.164Þ ð.166Þ
90% confidence interval ½.82, 1.51 ½.09, .49 ½0, .41
Observations 244 168 111
Log likelihood 2979.7 2685.7 2451.6
First-price auction misconception
model l1st
.59
ð.115Þ
1.03
ð.239Þ
1.71
ð.237Þ
90% confidence interval ½.39, .82 ½.72, 1.53 ½1.34, 2.23
Observations 244 168 111
Log likelihood 2980.5 2660.9 2420.0
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
1260 journal of political economyboth rounds, the l point estimates are more than three times higher for
the misconception model than for the optimal model with noise, the
confidence intervals are quite different, and the log likelihood is sub-
stantially higher for the misconception model. This indicates that while
the subjects who do not submit offers of 2 do not have the correct idea
about the mechanism, they are not merely making random errors that
are related to the economic cost of the errors. Their offers are better
characterized by the first-price misconception model augmented with a
modest level of decision error. Finally, column 3 displays estimates for
the 111 subjects who are most likely to have the misconception, either
because they reveal it directly on their decision cards ðn5 29Þ or because
on both of their cards their offer was above the drawn random price, soThis content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
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we cannot rule out this type of misconception ðn 5 82Þ. Obviously the
misconception model fits much better for this subset of subjects.
misconceptions and game form recognition 1261Table 5 reports estimates for a finite mixture model that estimates a
pooled payoff sensitivity parameter l and the probability vM that the op-
timal model or the first-price misconception model best describes the
data ðHarrison and Rustro¨m 2009Þ. The grand likelihood that combines
the two models is constructed as a probability weighted average of the
conditional likelihoods, where vM denotes the probability that the ðerror-
augmentedÞ first-price misconception model is correct:22
lnLðl; vM ; yiÞ5 o
i
ln½ð12 vM Þl OPTi 1 vM l 1sti : ð7Þ
The results in column 1 show that nearly two-thirds of all the offers are
more consistent with the misconception in round 1. The probability that
an offer is more consistent with the misconception model is estimated
reasonably accurately, and for round 1, the 90 percent confidence in-
terval never includes an equal likelihood of the two models ði.e., vM 5
0:5Þ. Offers are better approximated by the first-price misconception
model, although this model predicts offers that exceed observed mean
offers when the maximum random price takes on its highest values.
Columns 2 and 3 allow the mixture probability vM to be a linear func-
tion of dummy variables corresponding to the different subsets of sub-
jects considered in the different columns of table 4. A dummy variable
D picks up the increase in the probability of the misconception for
subjects who either offer a price that differs by more than 5¢ from 2
ðcol. 2Þ or reveal or may have the first-price misconception ðcol. 3Þ as
vM 5 v0 1 v1D. The omitted case ðcaptured by the intercept v0Þ repre-
sents the misconception probability for subjects who submit offers at
or near 2 or who reveal that they do not have a misconception. These
subjects are best classified by the optimal model; for the others the v1
estimates indicate that the likelihood of a misconception is highly sig-
nificant.23
On one hand, the comparison of models yields a consistent pattern of
failure of unmodified revealed preference theory and of framing theo-
ries. The BDM does not result in an accurate measure of the known pref-
erence. A direct application of revealed preference theory does not sug-
gest a reason why. Application of framing theories leads to a substantial
22 This approach assumes that any offer can come from both models, but it includes the
boundary case in which one model or the other completely generates the offer. Alternative
approaches and interpretations are possible ðEl-Gamal and Grether 1995Þ.
23 While in principle it is possible to combine the two categories with two dummy vari-
ables into one regression, there is considerable overlap between the subjects who do not
offer near 2 and who may have the first-price misconception. This complicates the inter-
pretation of the dummy variables. A specification with a full set of interactions also leaves
some categories with a small number of cases, making their estimates unreliable.
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TABLE 5
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Finite Mixture Model Logit Choice Error
Parameter l and Likelihood of First-Price Auction Misconception Model vM
Misconception
Likelihood
vM 5 v0 1 v1D
Model ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ
A. Round 1
Payoff sensitivity l 4.49 5.59 5.06
ð.839Þ ð.735Þ ð.787Þ
90% confidence interval ½3.41, 6.08 ½4.51, 6.99 ½3.77, 6.44
Misconception Prob vM .65
ð.046Þ
90% confidence interval ½.59, .74
Intercept Prob v0 .00 .41
ð.00Þ ð.070Þ
90% confidence interval ½.00, .00 ½.31, .53
Dummy on offers not on 2 v1 .85
ð.033Þ
90% confidence interval ½.79, .89
Dummy on possible misconception v1 .50
ð.078Þ
90% confidence interval ½.37, .62
Observations 245 245 245
Log likelihood 2932.4 2884.9 2913.1
B. Round 2
Payoff sensitivity l 2.65 4.39 2.40
ð.824Þ ð.948Þ ð.699Þ
90% confidence interval ½1.68, 4.67 ½3.26, 6.25 ½1.94, 4.45
Misconception Prob vM .42
ð.059Þ
90% confidence interval ½.34, .54
Intercept Prob v0 .00 .00
ð.00Þ ð.028Þ
90% confidence interval ½.00, .00 ½.00, .11
Dummy on offers not on 2 v1 .76
ð.052Þ
90% confidence interval ½.67, .85
Dummy on possible misconception v1 .99
ð.096Þ
90% confidence interval ½.71, 1.00
Observations 244 244 244
Log likelihood 2962.5 2913.9 2927.8
Note.—Standard errors are in parentheses.
misspecification of the preference. On the other hand, the theory of
game formmisconception proves helpful. Close examination of the data
1262 journal of political economy
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many of these untrained subjects appear to be based on amisconception
of the task. They think that it is a first-price auction rather than a second
price auction. That insight provides a key tool with which to apply the
theory of game form misconception. The subjects consist of at least two
groups. One group understands the game form as a second-price auction
and behaves substantially as game theory predicts. Another group has a
misconceptions and game form recognition 1263misconception of the game form as a first-price auction and under that
model behaves substantially as game theory predicts. The mixture of
these groups leads to a pattern of mean offers that might be expected
from framing or endowment effects, even though classical “rational
choice” models from auction theory give a reasonably accurate account.
While repeated choice tends to alert some subjects about their miscon-
ception, the most powerful correction comes with exposure to their mis-
take and its associated cost.
VII. Concluding Observations and Summary
The experiment we report demonstrates the failure of game form rec-
ognition in the context of a very simple BDM preference measurement
exercise. Two general points follow from the demonstration. First, mis-
conceptions should be taken seriously as an explanatory theory of choice
even in controlled laboratory experiments conducted using simple mea-
surement methods. Choices cannot be interpreted reliably as revealing
preferences. Second, the influence of context can be misinterpreted as
evidence supporting a class of nonstandard preferences because the data
generated by the BDM can be mistakenly interpreted as a preference
constructed through framing effects. In particular, the failure of game
form recognition can masquerade as support for the theory of framing,
such as preferences constructed from reference points. In part, the prob-
lem can be traced to the foundations of the theory of framing, where the
failure of game form recognition is incorrectly defined as a violation of
procedural invariance and thus as a failure of rationality and as evidence
of nontraditional forms of preferences.
Our research strategy is to study commodities with an induced pref-
erence that is so obvious that there would seem to be nothing to test. A
dollar is worth a dollar. Since we know the preference for the commod-
ity, we can focus on the measurement method, its reliability, and inter-
pretations of the measurements through a comparison with the known
preference. Does the method accurately measure what it is designed to
measure? Or are other elements of the context inadvertently incorpo-
rated in the measurement? Clearly, this experiment is only an example,
but it serves to demonstrate the existence of a mismeasurement problem
that can accompany applications of the BDM.
The existence of mistakes causes no particularly new problems for the
theory of revealed preference. Many instances of mistakes and poor mea-
surement of one form or another are addressed in the literature, and the
addition of randomness can produce extremely powerful models ðe.g.,
Echenique, Lee, and Shum 2011Þ. However, our experiment demon-
strates that systematic mistakes can be incorrectly interpreted as specialThis content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
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forms of preferences. Logic calls either for a specification of the mistake
and a test for the mistake or for an improved method of measurement.
1264 journal of political economyWe were able to identify the mistake with some precision in our experi-
ment, and in other experiments themistakemight also be easy to specify.
The example with the word “LEFT” in figure 1 suggests that the concept
of information might be useful in dealing with mistakes when attempt-
ing to reconcile competing theories. The choice from among the ovals
does not reveal a fully informed preference until additional information
is provided.24
The simplicity of our experiment provides insights concerning the
nature of preferences and the tension between standard preference the-
ory and nonstandard preference theory. It also addresses the problem
of rejectability of framing theory mentioned in Section II, that according
to the theory, the process of observing can affect the observed. Framing
theory holds that the preference is influenced by the methods used to
observe and measure it. Consequently, experiments leading to a rejec-
tion of nonstandard preferences can be dismissed as having inadvertently
influenced the preference. For example, previous experiments demon-
strate that when subjects are well trained on the features of the BDM, a
WTA/WTP gap for mugs does not exist; but when subjects are not well
trained, the WTA/WTP gap for mugs is observed ðPlott and Zeiler 2005;
Isoni et al. 2011Þ. Kőszegi and Rabin ð2006Þ dismiss those experiments
and presumably the replications, based on a concern that the training
prevents the formation of appropriate reference points.25 Kahneman as-
serts that by training subjects with the BDM, Plott and Zeiler were lead-
ing subjects to choose according to the theory preferred by the experi-
menter.26 Yet, the experiments reported here appear to suggest a WTA/
24 Gul and Pesendorfer ð2008Þ suggest that “information” is the theoretical tool that can
account for mistakes while maintaining the classical theory of preference. However, how
information is presented can be a central issue. Information, when accompanied by “help-
ful hints,” can be even more effective. For example, adding horizontal black lines to fig. 1
above and below the puzzle-shaped figures can be interpreted as information, as can the
helpful hint to look at the white parts and not the black puzzle-shaped figures.
25 For instance, Kőszegi and Rabin ð2006, 1142Þ argue that “one interpretation of the
rare exceptions to laboratory findings of the ½endowment effect, such as Plott and Zeiler
½2005, is that they have successfully decoupled subjects’ expectations from their initial own-
ership status. Similarly, the field experiment by List ½2003, which replicates the effect for in-
experienced sports card collectors but finds that experienced collectors show amuch smaller,
insignificant effect, is consistent with our theory if more experienced traders come to expect
a high probability of parting with items they have just acquired.”
26 Kahneman ð2011, 471Þ criticizes Plott and Zeiler ð2005Þ because “they devised an
elaborate training procedure in which participants experienced the roles of both buyers
and sellers, and were explicitly taught to assess their true values. . . . Psychologists would con-
sider the method severely deficient, because it communicates to the participants a message
of what the experimenters consider appropriate behavior, which happens to coincide with
the experimenter’s theory.” We find this claim by Kahneman puzzling. The training process
used by Plott and Zeiler concerns the method ofmeasurement in order to reduce game form
misconceptions, and not the preference for the objects being measured. Plott and Zeiler also
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WTPgap since the asking price for the card is above the known value. The
“gap” in our experiment reflects a mistake as opposed to a preference
misconceptions and game form recognition 1265constructed from framing, and the conditions under which it goes away
cannot be attributed to experimental conditions that influence the frame
and thus change a preference.
The concepts of misconceptions andmistakes highlighted in this study
break the crucial connection between preference and choice in framing
theory. We know that the stated choice is a mistake because we induced
an objective preference, and the fact of a mistake is confirmed by the sys-
tematic reduction of the mistake across rounds. Since the choice reflects
a misconception rather than a preference, there is no support for a claim
that the axiom of invariance is violated as the frame changes, and there
is no inconsistency with rational choice. Choices that do not satisfy the
Kahneman and Tversky property of invariance can be mistakes and thus
need not reflect a nonstandard preference based on framing theory. In
fact, the theory of rational preference and choice, which framing theory
seeks to reject, actually provides an explanation of our experimental re-
sults. The theory of bidding in first-price auctions explains part of the
data, and the dynamics of choice adjustment toward the optimal offer,
through feedback and exposure to errors, explain more.
Framing effects are well documented. By highlighting subject mis-
takes, we are not suggesting that framing effects do not exist, but rather
how they should be interpreted. Anomalous results such as those re-
ported here may not occur only because of this particular measurement
method, since other methods have also returned evidence consistent with
frame-influenced choices, including the possibility of frame-induced mis-
takes. Framing influences could also affect important choices in the field,
especially those considered infrequently and by individuals with limited
abilities to evaluate alternatives such as retirement portfolio and insur-
ance choices ðThaler and Sunstein 2008Þ. Our results suggest that when
choices appear inconsistent with standard theory, a failure of game form
recognition could be part of the explanation. Consequently, researchers
and policy makers should consider choices made in unfamiliar environ-
ments as possibly reflecting mistakes, and not as evidence for nonstan-
dard preferences that might be influenced by reference points or other
factors associated with framing effects. Under this interpretation, policy
interventions to reduce mistakes and misconceptions can be part of the
process of aligning individuals’ choices with their own preferences. While
frame-induced mistakes are possible, so also are frame-induced mistake
corrections.
included experiments in which the subject experience part of training was absent but these
experiments were overlooked by Kahneman as were data in which subjects were presented
with degenerate lotteries after training. See Plott and Zeiler ð2011Þ.
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The issue of mistakes has important implications beyond the very sim-
ple experiment reported here. In particular, some widely cited criticisms
1266 journal of political economyof standard economic theory suffer from limited robustness that could
be due to mistakes.27 The variability of results reported in the literature is
understandable if one accepts the evidence presented here that system-
atic misconceptions of the game form accompany the widely used BDM
preference elicitation method. A root cause may be misconceptions re-
lated to game form together with a variety of BDM instructions used by
different researchers. However, we hasten to point out that we have pro-
duced no general theory of game formmisconceptions. Indeed, since the
nature of misconceptions is context dependent, falsifiability of any pro-
posed general theory of the failure of game form recognition is problem-
atic. There is a need to state a specific theory of themisconception in each
case.
Can the BDM be developed to accommodate the need both to avoid
game form misconceptions and also to avoid contaminating procedures
from the point of view of framing theory? We have not addressed that
question, and how it might be addressed depends on one’s understand-
ing of framing and framing theory.28 Economics rests on the hypothesis
that preferences exist and can be measured and that a clear distinction
exists between a preference and a decision. Decisions are often modeled
as complex processes that can reflect rules of thumb, simplifying as-
27 For example, some WTA/WTP gaps go away with greater subject experience ðPlott
and Zeiler 2005; Isoni et al. 2011Þ, anchoring and adjustment effects are much smaller in
some studies ðcompare Fudenberg, Levine, and Maniadis ½2012 to Ariely, Loewenstein, and
Prelec ½2003Þ, and manipulations of expectations of a trade do not have predicted impacts
on reference dependence ðGoette, Harms, and Springer 2012Þ. More recently, Heffetz and
List ð2014Þ demonstrate that the assignment of commodities does not influence the pref-
erences of the individual to whom they are assigned and is thus not associated with non-
standard preferences.
28 The related literature does hold suggestions. Our experimental results, and in par-
ticular the changed choice for many individuals who were exposed to a mistake, suggest
that experience works through a process of evolving game form recognition. The key role
of mistake exposure in second-price auctions is clearly documented by Kagel and Levin
ð1993Þ, who report that as a result of exposure to bid rejections, bidders have a deeper un-
derstanding of the rules and adjust their bidding behavior accordingly. Similarly, the data
produced in field experiments conducted by List ð2003Þ andHarrison and List ð2008Þ differ
from the data generated by untrained laboratory subjects because the subjects from the
field are familiar with the game form and do not have the same game formmisconceptions
as untrained subjects or inexperienced participants in the field. Similarly, Engelmann and
Hollard ð2010Þ demonstrate that practice and experience eliminate the trade asymmetry
typically associated with WTP and WTA differences. Gigerenzer et al. ð2008Þ give us a hint
suggesting that the concept of recognition heuristics might be useful in economics, which
is consistent with a focus on the process of decisionmaking as opposed to the development
of an underlying preference. A similar suggestion related to a process of recognition can be
found in Myerson ð1997Þ, which he refers to as “salient perturbations.” General axiomatic
concepts of rationality and the importance of context are developed in Aizerman and
Aleskerov ð1995Þ.
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sumptions, reference points, incomplete logic, and other phenomena
that can be associated with solving problems or assessing information
misconceptions and game form recognition 1267while the theory of preference occupies a different status. The additions
of random variables to model preferences from decision data such as the
logit model used here are illustrations. By contrast, the theory of framing
appears to rest on the assumption that preferences cannot be known
independent of the frame and perhaps are even created/constructed by
the frame. Thus, the constructed preference perspective of framing re-
sults in an unclear meaning of “preference measurement” and certainly
leaves ambiguous the meaning of “improved measurement” since, ac-
cording to the theory, the preference itself is influenced by the measure-
ment process. More training or detailed descriptions, including a sum-
mary of the incentive compatibility of the BDM mechanism sometimes
used in instructions, change the frame and thus influence the preference
according to framing theory. Thus, it might be impossible to determine if
measurement is improved under the maintained assumption of framing
theory.
We were drawn to this research by a tension that exists in the litera-
ture. We conclude that the tension stems from a missing element of
theory: a solid connection between the game form and an individual’s
understanding of the game form. The needed theory might be related to
perception, a concept that receives great emphasis by Tversky and Kah-
neman, who helpfully initiate specific axioms to capture departures of
perceptions from reality. Logic, learning, or other phenomena could be
important keys as well. Such tools are welcome additions to an effort to
identify failures of game form recognition in economic processes. We do
not know how to close the gaps among the various sciences involved in
the controversy about the theoretical foundations of preferences, and
we suspect that it will require input from a variety of disciplines outside
economics. Our experiment and analysis suggest that the key to under-
standing framing effects may be changing perceptions and not labile
preferences.
ReferencesAizerman, Mark, and Fuad Aleskerov. 1995. The Theory of Choice. Amsterdam:
North-Holland.
Ariely, Dan, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec. 2003. “ ‘Coherent Arbi-
trariness’: Stable Demand Curves without Stable Preferences.” Q.J.E. 118:73–
105.
Banerji, A., and Neha Gupta. 2014. “Detection, Identification, and Estimation of
Loss Aversion: Evidence from an Auction Experiment.” American Econ. J.:
Microeconomics 6:91–133.
Becker, Gordon, Morris DeGroot, and Jacob Marschak. 1964. “Measuring Utility
by a Single-Response Sequential Method.” Behavioral Sci. 9:226–32.This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Bohm, Peter, Johan Linde´n, and Joakim Sonnega˚rd. 1997. “Eliciting Reservation
Prices: Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanisms vs. Markets.” Econ. J. 107:1079–
C
—
C
C
Ec
El
En
Fu
G
G
G
G
H
—
H
—
H
—
H
1268 journal of political economy89.
harness, Gary, Edi Karni, and Dan Levin. 2008. “On the Conjunction Fallacy in
Probability Judgment: New Experimental Evidence.” Working paper, Univ.
California, Santa Barbara.
——. 2010. “On the Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment: New
Experimental Evidence Regarding Linda.”Games and Econ. Behavior 68:551–56.
hou, Eileen, Margaret McConnell, Rosemarie Nagel, and Charles Plott. 2009.
“The Control of Game Form Recognition in Experiments: Understanding
Dominant Strategy Failures in a Simple Two Person ‘Guessing’ Game.” Exper-
imental Econ. 12:159–79.
ox, James, and Duncan James. 2012. “Clocks and Trees: Isomorphic Dutch
Auctions and Centipede Games.” Econometrica 80:883–903.
henique, Federico, Sangmok Lee, and Matthew Shum. 2011. “The Money
Pump as a Measure of Revealed Preference Violations.” J.P.E. 119:1201–23.
-Gamal, Mahmoud, and David Grether. 1995. “Are People Bayesian? Un-
covering Behavioral Strategies.” J. American Statis. Assoc. 90:1137–45.
gelmann, Dirk, and Guillaume Hollard. 2010. “Reconsidering the Effect of
Market Experience on the ‘Endowment Effect.’ ” Econometrica 78:2005–19.
denberg, Drew, David Levine, and Zacharias Maniadis. 2012. “On the
Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments.” American
Econ. J.: Microeconomics 4:131–45.
igerenzer, Gerd, Ralph Hertwig, Ulrich Hoffrage, and Peter Sedlmeier. 2008.
“Cognitive Illusions Reconsidered.” In Handbook of Experimental Economics Re-
sults, edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith, 1018–34. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
oette, Lorenz, Annette Harms, and Charles Sprenger. 2012. “Expectations as
Reference Points: A New Empirical Test.” Working paper, Stanford Univ.
rether, David, Charles Plott, Daniel Row, Martin Sereno, and John Allman.
2007. “Mental Processes and Strategic Equilibration: An fMRI Study of Selling
Strategies in Second Price Auctions.” Experimental Econ. 10:105–22.
ul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2008. “The Case for Mindless Econom-
ics.” In The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, edited by A. Caplin
and A. Schotter, 3–42. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
arrison, Glenn. 1990. “Risk Attitudes in First-Price Auction Experiments: A
Bayesian Analysis.” Rev. Econ. and Statis. 72:541–46.
——. 1992. “Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions: Reply.” A.E.R.
82:426–43.
arrison, Glenn, and John List. 2004. “Field Experiments.” J. Econ. Literature 42:
1009–55.
——. 2008. “Naturally Occurring Markets and Exogenous Laboratory Exper-
iments: A Case Study of the Winner’s Curse.” Econ. J. 118:822–43.
arrison, Glenn, and E. Elisabet Rutstro¨m. 2008. “Risk Aversion in the Labo-
ratory.” In Risk Aversion in Experiments, Research in Experimental Economics,
vol. 12, edited by James Cox and Glenn Harrison, 41–196. Bingly, UK: Emerald
Group.
——. 2009. “Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory: One Wedding and
a Decent Funeral.” Experimental Econ. 12:133–58.
arstad, Ronald. 2000. “Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders’ Experience
with Pricing Rules.” Experimental Econ. 3:261–80.This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Heffetz, Ori, and John List. 2014. “Is the Endowment Effect an Expectations
Effect?” J. European Econ. Assoc. 12:1396–1422.
Ir
Is
Ja
Ka
Ka
Ka
Kn
Kő
—
La
Le
Li
—
Li
M
M
M
N
—
Pl
misconceptions and game form recognition 1269win, Julie, Gary McClelland, Michael McKee, William Schulze, and N. Elizabeth
Norden. 1998. “Payoff Dominance vs. Cognitive Transparency in Decision
Making.” Econ. Inquiry 36:272–85.
oni, Andrea, Graham Loomes, and Robert Sugden. 2011. “The Willingness to
Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the ‘Endowment Effect,’ Subject Misconcep-
tions, and the Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Comment.”
A.E.R. 101:991–1011.
mes, Duncan. 2007. “Stability of Risk Preference Parameter Estimates within
the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Procedure.” Experimental Econ. 10:123–41.
gel, John, and Dan Levin. 1993. “Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder
Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers
of Bidders.” Econ. J. 103:868–79.
hneman, Daniel. 2011.Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus&Giroux.
hneman, Daniel, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler. 1990. “Experimental Tests
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem.” J.P.E. 98:1325–47.
etsch, Jack, Fang-Fang Tang, and Richard Thaler. 2001. “The Endowment
Effect and RepeatedMarket Trials: Is the Vickrey Auction Demand Revealing?”
Experimental Econ. 4:257–69.
szegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. 2006. “A Model of Reference-Dependent
Preferences.” Q.J.E. 121:1133–65.
——. 2008. “Revealed Mistakes and Revealed Preferences.” In The Foundations
of Positive and Normative Economics, edited by A. Caplin and A. Schotter, 193–
209. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
nge, Andreas, and Anmol Ratan. 2010. “Multi-dimensional Reference-
Dependent Preferences in Sealed-Bid Auctions—How ðMostÞ Laboratory
Experiments Differ from the Field.” Games and Econ. Behavior 68:634–45.
vine, David K. 2012. Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? Cambridge: Openbook
Pub.
chtenstein, Sarah, and Paul Slovic. 1971. “Reversals of Preference between Bids
and Choices in Gambling Decisions.” J. Experimental Psychology 89:46–55.
——. 2006. The Construction of Preference. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
st, John. 2003. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?” Q.J.E.
118:41–71.
cDaniel, Tanga, and E. Elisabet Rutstro¨m. 2001. “Decision Making Costs and
Problem Solving Performance.” Experimental Econ. 4:145–61.
urphy, James, Thomas Stevens, and Lava Yadav. 2010. “A Comparison of
Induced Value and Home-Grown Value Experiments to Test for Hypothetical
Bias in Contingent Valuation.” Environmental and Resource Econ. 47:111–23.
yerson, Roger. 1997. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press.
oussair, Charles, Stephane Robin, and Bernard Ruffieux. 2004a. “Do Con-
sumers Really Refuse to Buy Genetically Modified Food?” Econ. J. 114:102–
20.
——. 2004b. “Revealing Consumers’ Willingness-to-Pay: A Comparison of the
BDM Mechanism and the Vickrey Auction.” J. Econ. Psychology 25:725–41.
ott, Charles R. 1996. Comments on Daniel Kahneman, “New Challenges to the
Rationality Assumption.” In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour,
edited by Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Colombatto, Mark Perlman, and Christian
Schmidt, 220–24. London: Macmillan.This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Plott, Charles R., and Kathryn Zeiler. 2005. “The Willingness to Pay–Willingness
to Accept Gap, the ‘Endowment Effect,’ Subject Misconceptions, and the Ex-
1270 journal of political economyperimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations.” A.E.R. 95:530–45.
———. 2011. “The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the ‘Endow-
ment Effect,’ Subject Misconceptions, and the Experimental Procedures for
Eliciting Valuations: Reply.” A.E.R. 101:1012–28.
Rutstro¨m, E. Elisabet. 1998. “Home-Grown Values and Incentive Compatible
Auction Design.” Internat. J. Game Theory 27:427–41.
Rydval, Ondrej, Andreas Ortmann, and Michal Ostatnicky. 2009. “Three Very
Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them.” J. Econ. Behavior and Org. 72:
589–601.
Thaler, Richard, and Cass Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth and Happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1974. “Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases.” Science 185:1124–30.
———. 1981. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Sci-
ence 211:453–58.
———. 1986. “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions.” J. Bus. 59:S251–
S278.
Urbancic, Michael. 2011. “Testing Distributional Dependence in the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak Mechanism.” Working paper, Univ. California, Berkeley.
Vossler, Christian, and Michael McKee. 2006. “Induced-Value Tests of Contin-
gent Valuation Elicitation Mechanisms.” Environmental and Resource Econ. 35:
137–68.
Wilcox, Nathaniel. 2008. “Stochastic Models for Binary Discrete Choice under
Risk: A Critical Primer and Econometric Comparison.” In Risk Aversion in
Experiments, Research in Experimental Economics, vol. 12, edited by James Cox
and Glenn Harrison, 197–292. Bingly, UK: Emerald Group.
———. 2011. “Stochastically More Risk-Averse: A Contextual Theory of Sto-
chastic Discrete Choice under Risk.” J. Econometrics 162:89–104.This content downloaded from 131.215.70.231 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 11:01:38 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
